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Abstract 
Despite fifty years of empirical and theoretical research on social influence, one of the great puzzles of social 
science remains unanswered: How is cultural diversity possible? Axelrod (1997) has proposed a model of 
cultural dissemination that explains cultural diversity as the consequence of two fundamental social mechanisms 
– social influence and homophily. Subsequent work has shown that within this framework, cultural diversity is 
not robust against small amounts of noise. However, a key simplification of the original analysis has not been 
explored – Axelrod’s assumption that all cultural states are nominal. We integrate metric states into Axelrod’s 
original model and thus align it with previous formal models of social influence that did not incorporate 
homophily. We show that in the extended cultural dissemination model, metric states undermine cultural 
diversity, even without noise, by creating sufficient cultural overlap for mutual influence between agents. We 
then show how “bounded confidence,” a recent extension of social influence models, allows cultural diversity to 
persist in cultural dissemination models as well, even in the presence of noise. However, the solution turns out to 
be less robust than we would like. Diversity can be sustained only with a relatively small number of metric 
states, low levels of noise, and a narrow confidence interval. We then suggest the need to incorporate 
“negativity” into future studies as a possible solution to the puzzle of cultural diversity. 
 
1. Introduction 
Cultural diversity is both persistent and precarious. People in different regions of the world are increasingly 
exposed to global influences from mass media, internet communication, interregional migration and mass 
tourism. While some authors expect that this may lead to the emergence of a global monoculture, others point to 
the pervasiveness of cultural differences (cf. Greig, 2002). How is stable diversity of cultures possible? Recently, 
formal modelers of cultural dynamics, most prominently Axelrod (1997), have argued that a few simple, 
fundamental mechanisms of social interaction may suffice to explain stable cultural diversity and its conditions 
(e.g. Latané and Nowak, 1997; Mark 1998; Klemm et al 2003a,b; Macy et al, 2003). These models combine two 
elementary social mechanisms, homophily and social influence. Homophily is attraction towards similar others, 
or the law that “birds of a feather flock together” (McPherson et al, 2001). Social influence implies the tendency 
to become more similar to influential others (Festinger et al, 1950). It seems straightforward that a combination 
of social influence and homophily drives populations towards cultural homogeneity. However, Axelrod’s (1997) 
computational studies showed how local convergence can lead to global differentiation. The key assumption that 
generated this result was cultural speciation. Axelrod assumed social interaction between neighbors to be entirely 
cut off when actors disagree in all cultural dimensions, analogous to the inability of sexual organisms with a 
common ancestor to mate once they differentiate beyond a critical threshold. As a consequence, homophily and 
social influence can generate isolated regions that are stable, because there is no more influence from neighbors 
and agents share the same culture within the region.  
Axelrod’s result has inspired a range of follow up studies, many of which supported his basic 
conclusions (e.g. Mark 1998, 2003; Parisi et al 2003), albeit with some modifications (e.g. Shibani et al 2001; 
Greig, 2002). But Klemm et al (2003a,b; (for a recent overview see San Miguel et al, 2005) challenged the 
robustness of stable diversity in Axelrod’s model. They showed that a population that exhibits stable diversity 
under Axelrod’s assumptions “drifts” into a virtual monoculture if a very small amount of “cultural mutation” 
(or noise) distorts the dynamics. This resonates with earlier results obtained using models of opinion dynamics in 
influence networks with fixed structures and without the assumption of homophilous dynamic networks (French 
1956; Abelson 1964;  Friedkin & Johnson 1999). Abelson proved that for these fixed-network opinion formation 
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models, a very weak condition is sufficient to guarantee convergence  to global consensus, namely, the network 
needs to be “compact,” such that there are no subgroups that are entirely cut off from outside influences.  
In this paper, we will show that conditions for stable diversity become even more restrictive when we 
relax another implausible assumption in Axelrod’s original model, the assumption that all cultural differences are 
qualitative (hence represented as nominal scales). This is a key difference between opinion formation models (in 
the tradition of French and Abelson) and the cultural dissemination framework. In the wake of French and 
Abelson, opinion formation models employ metric state spaces, which allow for the gradual and stepwise 
convergence towards uniformity that is the typical model outcome. In this paper, we will integrate into Axelrod’s 
cultural dissemination framework the assumption that at least some cultural dimensions are metric. We show that 
– as in traditional social influence models – cultural homogeneity is then the ineluctable outcome. Moreover, that 
is the case even when we assume away all noise. Given that different groups almost certainly have at least one 
cultural difference that is quantitative (such as how much they like jazz), we are back to our original question: 
how is stable diversity possible?  
We propose and analyze a solution to the puzzle. We adopt from Deffuant et al. (2000, 2005) a recent 
extension of opinion formation models. Their assumption of “bounded confidence” means that agents are only 
influenced by those whose opinions differ from their own by not more than a certain threshold (see also 
Hegselmann & Krause 2002). Bounded confidence implements Axelrod’s original homophily assumption, but 
now for a metric state space. Recent studies using fixed-structure social influence models have shown how 
bounded confidence can explain stable diversity. With moderate confidence thresholds, differentiation into a 
small number of opposed radical factions becomes possible. We conjecture that bounded confidence also leads 
to stable diversity in the cultural dissemination framework (with homophilous dynamic networks). To test this, 
we incorporate bounded confidence assumptions into our extended version of the cultural dissemination model. 
We then systematically explore the effects of different confidence thresholds on stable cultural diversity in state 
spaces that include both metric and nominal states. Section 2 describes our model. In Section 3 we present 
computational experiments and results. In section 4, results are discussed and conclusions are drawn. 
2. Model 
The simulated population consists of N agents, of which each agent has a subset of the population as his 
neighborhood. Axelrod used a regular lattice to spatially order the population. We are not interested in effects of 
the spatial arrangement in this paper, so we adopt Axelrod’s regular lattice with edges (no torus) and von 
Neumann neighborhood of size 4. Axelrod typically used grids with 10x10 cells, but also studied different grid 
sizes. Every cell is occupied by exactly one agent. At any point in time, the cultural state of an agent i is a vector 
of F elements, called “features”. On any single feature, an agent has a “trait” represented by an integer value in 
the range of 0..Q-1, where Q is the number of possible traits. Formally, the state of an agent is  
⊂−∈= }1,...,1,0{),,...,,( 21 Qsssss ixiFiii N0.  (1) 
In the original cultural dissemination model, the distance between two traits on the same feature is meaningless. 
The traits of two different agents on this feature are either equal or they are different. To integrate metric 
features, we assume that for metric features distances between two traits q and r in this range are meaningfully 
defined by q-r. To distinguish metric from nominal features, the parameter Fn ≤ F indicates the number of 
nominal features. All features f for which f ≤ Fn are nominal (as in the original model), all other features are 
metric. This model is equivalent to the original cultural dissemination model if Fn=F.  
 The cultural dissemination model specifies dynamics as follows. Initially, every agent is assigned a 
random state where every possible trait value has equal probability to be assigned. In every discreet time step t, 
one pair of neighbors (ij) randomly gets an interaction chance with equal probability. Following Klemm et al 
(2003a,b), we assume a small probability r that in one time step prior to interaction, the trait value of a randomly 
selected agent on a randomly selected feature will be perturbed to a randomly selected new value. When 
selected, the probability for actual interaction between i and j, pij, is derived from the cultural overlap oij between 
i and j, where 0 ≤ oij ≤ 1. In Axelrod’s original approach, cultural overlap is computed as the proportion of 
features on which i and j have identical traits. To adapt this for metric features, we define cultural overlap 
between two agents i and j for a metric feature f, oijf, as distance between their traits on this feature, divided by 
the maximal possible distance (0 ≤ oij ≤ 1). To obtain a comparable overlap measure for nominal features, we set 
oijf =1 if i and j have different traits on this feature, and oijf 0 otherwise. Technically, 
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The overall cultural overlap between i and j, oij, is obtained as the average cultural overlap across all features, or  
∑ == Ff ijfij oFo 11  (3). This definition of overlap is compatible with Axelrod’s original model when F= Fn. 
To implement bounded confidence, we assume that the probability of interaction, pij, is a non-linear 
function of cultural overlap, unless confidence is not bounded. The probability of interaction increases linearly in 
cultural similarity, but only when cultural overlap exceeds the confidence thresholdτ, where 10 ≤≤ τ . We also 
assume that the probability of interaction may be affected by a small amount of random interaction. Klemm et al 
have shown how mutation can considerably change the dynamics of the model, because it can create bridges for 
influence between agents who are otherwise too dissimilar to interact. However, random interaction may also 
occur without the spontaneous change of traits. In many social contexts, such as culturally mixed classrooms or 
work groups, at least occasional social influence takes place between culturally dissimilar people, without the 
need of a change of their traits prior to interaction. To capture this random interaction, we introduce a second 
noise parameter r′ that enters into the calculation of the actual probability of interaction. When the cultural 
overlap falls below the confidence threshold, the probability of interaction is r′ . Technically, 
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Equation (2), (3) and (4) implement the assumption of homophily in the extended model of cultural 
dissemination. If the confidence threshold is set to its maximal level, i.e. τ = 1, and both noise parameters are 
zero pij is defined equivalently to the original model. Social influence is likewise implemented equivalently to 
Axelrod (1997). When interaction takes place and there is at least one feature on which i and j do not yet agree, 
one of them is selected at random to adopt the position of his counterpart on a randomly selected feature in 
which they are different. The extended model reduces to Axelrod’s specification, if τ = 1, Fn=F, and r= r′ =0. 
3. Results 
3.1 Replications 
We begin by replicating Axelrod’s (1997) model in which there is no noise (r= r′ = 0), a purely nominal state 
space (F=Fn), and unbounded confidence (τ =1). Results show that under a large range of conditions the 
following pattern arises: Initially, cultural diversity declines rapidly and the average similarity between 
neighbors increases. At some time t, the system reaches an equilibrium state with stable diversity, i.e. with a 
number of distinct “cultural regions” in the population. A cultural region is a set of direct or indirect neighbors 
who all have the same cultural state. Axelrod (and many follow up papers) used the number of cultural regions in 
equilibrium as a measure of diversity2.To provide a baseline and to validate our re-implementation of the original 
model, we used the parameter settings (τ = 1, Fn=F, and r= r′ =0) to replicate a condition that Axelrod showed to 
be conducive to relatively high diversity. In this baseline condition, N=100 (10x10 grid), neighborhoods are 
small (4 neighbors), there are few features (F=5) and there are relatively many trait values per feature (Q=15). 
Based on 10 realizations, Axelrod reported for this condition an average of 20 stable “cultural regions” in 
equilibrium. We obtained an average of 19.55 based on 100 realizations3.  
                                                 
2 Klemm et al (2003a,b) use the relative size of the largest cultural region in equilibrium.  
3 We also replicated all other results reported in Axelrod (1997) very closely. The analyses reported in this paper start from a 
baseline condition that Axelrod has shown to be conducive to high diversity under the assumptions of his original model. 
We have also explored other sets of conditions (in particular more features and traits, other spatial and neighborhood 
structures). Results of these studies generally support our conclusions and will be reported in a longer version of the paper. 
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 We then replicated Klemm et al. (2003a) by introducing a small amount of mutation (r >0). As 
expected, we found that small levels of mutation (r ≤≈ 10-3) were sufficient to destabilize diversity so that the 
system gradually moves from a random start towards a metastable state close to cultural homogeneity.  
 Figure 1 shows a typical dynamic generated by our implementation for a noise level of r = 10-3 ( r′ =0).  
Figure 1 demonstrates how even with mutation, cultural differentiation can persist for a long time. Such states 
typically persist for 100000 or more time steps in this condition, and then change in a relatively rapid transition 
into a new, temporarily stable state. Typically, cultural diversity declines in the course of these transitions and 
the population moves towards a near monoculture. For reliability, we ran 20 independent realizations of this 
experiment until the level of diversity, averaged over 200.000 iterations, became stable or the number of 
iterations exceeded 107. We found an average of 1.55 cultural regions in the end-state. Figure 1 also illustrates 
how, once a near-monocultural state is reached, there can be some fluctuation that quickly moves the population 
out of this state into a new consensus state (between t=340000 and t=390000 in the example). This shows that 
mutations have two effects. First, new states can arise spontaneously and spread. Second, mutations can create 
overlap and thus bridges for social influence between otherwise isolated cultural regions, reducing diversity in 
the system. At the low level of noise used for figure 1, the second effect prevails. Mutations prevent the 
population from “freezing” in multicultural states with multiple disconnected cultural regions, with the eventual 
result of a monoculture with small random distortions. The mechanism of random interaction is different from 
mutation. Random interaction only creates bridges for influence between otherwise disconnected actors, but does 
not also introduce new diversity in the population. The long run outcome of random interaction can only be 
monoculture. To explain, monocultures are the unique absorbing states of the dynamics and from every 
multicultural state, several monocultural states are reachable within a finite number of steps. Additional 
experiments confirm this expectation, but show also that 107 iterations are not sufficient to reach monoculture in 
all realizations. A ceteris paribus replication of the baseline condition with random interaction ( r′ =0.001) but 
without mutation (r=0) yielded on average 1.11 stable cultural regions in the end-state.  
    
t=60000…160000 t=210000…340000 t=350000 t=390000..530000 
Figure 1. Dynamics of typical model run with mutation (N=100, von Neumann neighborhood, F=5,Q=15, τ = 1, 
Fn=F, and mutation, r=0.001, r′ =0). Color of a cell represents trait on feature 1. 
 
3.2 Metric features 
Axelrod (1997) and most follow up papers use a concept of polarization that does not distinguish between 
dissimilarity and antagonism. In their terminology, a “polarized” outcome is a multicultural state in which 
neighboring cultures are different on all features. Cultural features are assumed to differ qualitatively and are 
modeled with nominal scales. Two agents either agree or disagree on a certain feature, but there is no degree of 
agreement or disagreement on this feature. This differs from many empirical studies (e.g. DiMaggio, Evans, and 
Bryson 1996), who define polarization as the tendency for individuals to hold extreme and uncompromising 
views. More importantly, maximal disagreement, the only condition under which two neighbors no longer 
influence each other in the cultural dissemination model, is a much more unusual and extreme situation when 
states are metric. With metric features, maximal disagreement requires that two neighbors adopt traits at opposite 
ends of the scale on every feature. Moreover, with a nominal feature, a change from total agreement on a feature 
can only be towards total disagreement, resulting in an overlap of zero after the change. By contrast, with a 
metric feature change can decrease the level of agreement, but leaves overlap above zero except for extreme 
cases. Accordingly, we expect that – ceteris paribus – there will be considerably less diversity compared to 
Axelrod’s original model with all nominal features if at least one cultural feature is metric. As a test, we 
replicated the baseline condition, but with only a single change, the introduction of one metric feature (Fn =4). 
Figure 2 below shows a typical dynamic for this scenario.  
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T=10000 t=20000 t=30000 equilibrium (t ≥ 40000) 
Figure 2. Dynamics of typical model run with one metric feature (N=100, von Neumann neighborhood, F= Fn 
=5, FN = 4, Q=15, τ = 1, r= r′ =0). Color of a cell represents trait on nominal feature 1. 
 Figure 2 reveals a striking effect of metric features. Only one metric feature is sufficient to entirely 
wipe out diversity in a condition that is highly conducive to stable diversity without metric features. No noise is 
needed for this (r= r′ = 0). The explanation is that with a single metric feature, it is much less likely that cultural 
overlap between any two agents declines to zero. As a consequence, direct or indirect influence remains possible 
between all agents in the population. Sooner or later, all agents will thus come to agree with all their neighbors 
on all features, including those that are nominal. This reflects the results of the social influence models with 
static networks, but it also shows that unlike in these models, the assumption of a continuous opinion space is 
not even needed to obtain monoculture. With Q=15, our opinion space is discreet. It is the metric that matters, 
not the continuity. For reliability, we ran 100 independent realizations. In all realizations, the population 
converged to full homogeneity in equilibrium.   
 We found that one metric feature is sufficient to eradicate diversity in the baseline condition, but what 
about other conditions? As a more extreme test, we further reduced the relative weight of the metric feature by 
increasing the number of nominal features to 49, with just one metric feature. However, as Axelrod showed, 
more features also decrease diversity in the absence of metric features. To control for this, we simultaneously set 
Q=150, ten times as much as in the baseline. As a benchmark, we ran the experiment without a metric feature 
and with 50 nominal features and 150 traits (F=Fn = 50, Q=150, r= r′ =0, τ=0). Based on 20 realizations, we 
obtained 15.8 average stable cultural regions in equilibrium. However, with one metric feature (F=50, Fn = 49, 
ceteris paribus), we found that monoculture is the unique equilibrium. This shows that a single metric feature 
undermines diversity even when the proportion of features that are metric is negligible. 
3.3 Metric features and bounded confidence 
Metric features eliminate stable diversity for a simple reason: neighbors are rarely maximally dissimilar and 
therefore retain a positive probability of interaction, however small it may be. Using a solution similar to the one 
proposed by Axelrod, recent studies using fixed-network “opinion formation” models showed how stable 
diversity can nevertheless obtain even with metric opinions. “Bounded confidence” models assume that agents 
are influenced only by those other agents whose opinion differs from their own not more than a certain 
confidence level (e.g. Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Deffuant et al, 2005). These studies show that moderate 
confidence levels are sufficient for polarization of the population into a small number of factions.  
However, these studies used the “opinion formation” model where networks are assumed to be fixed 
and only the states of nodes (opinions) can vary. It is not at all obvious that this result generalizes to dynamic 
networks in which relations vary in response to changes in the nodes. We want to know if bounded confidence 
can also explain diversity in “cultural dissemination” models with network dynamics driven by homophily.  
There are two potential problems in generalizing from the bounded confidence results in previous 
studies -- the restricted size of the confidence intervals (i.e. low confidence thresholds) and the absence of noise. 
Bounded confidence studies typically assume much more restricted confidence levels than those that correspond 
to Axelrod’s model with nominal features. For example, Hegselmann and Krause (2002) assumed 5% 
confidence intervals around each opinion, within which neighbors could interact. That is an extremely narrow 
interval compared to what Axelrod assumed. Using nominal features, Axelrod was able to obtain stable cultural 
regions with F= Fn =5, which corresponds to a cultural difference of 80% of the maximum (i.e., neighbors have 
different traits on 4 out of 5 features). We need to know if metric features with 80% confidence intervals can also 
sustain cultural diversity, even without noise. In addition, allowing for noise (either as mutation or random 
interaction) seems likely to destabilize diversity, even with highly restricted confidence intervals.  
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To answer these questions, we conducted three computational experiments in which we manipulated the 
size of confidence levels and the amount of noise. In the first experiment, we assessed the maximum interval on 
a metric feature that is possible before diversity collapses, without allowing for any noise. We then ran two 
ceteris paribus replications, one with only mutation (r=0.001, r′ = 0) and one with only random interaction (r=0, 
r′ = 0.001). In all experiments, we started from a model with a very narrow interval (τ = 0.05) and increased the 
confidence interval up to unbounded confidence (τ = 1), in steps of 0.05. All other assumptions remained 
unchanged relative to the baseline condition with one metric feature (F=5, Fn = 4, Q=15). Figure 3 charts the 
effects of τ on the average number of cultural regions in equilibrium, based on 20 realizations in each condition. 
Figure 3 shows that without noise, cultural diversity can be sustained with confidence intervals as wide as 80%, 
a level that corresponds to the maximal cultural distance that Axelrod assumed for the baseline condition. For 
confidence levels belowτ=0.70, the number of cultural regions in equilibrium approaches the theoretical 
maximum of 100, indicating a population in which almost all agents are cultural isolates. Inspection of the 
convergence times until equilibrium shows why. From a random start, confidence intervals below 70% are 
sufficient to effectively preclude interaction. It becomes extremely unlikely that two neighboring agents will 
have sufficient cultural overlap to obtain a positive probability of interaction4. Figure 3 also shows how this 
pattern changes as confidence intervals increase. At an 80% confidence interval, corresponding to Axelrod’s 
assumption of overlap in at least one out of five nominal features in the baseline model, the number of cultural 
regions falls to 35.15, but this is still well above the diversity Axelrod found (20) in a model with only nominal 
features. Only when confidence intervals reach τ=0.9 or higher does diversity collapse into a single monoculture.  
 While an 80% confidence interval suggests that bounded confidence has a highly robust effect in 
sustaining diversity, we should keep in mind that this assumes a world without any noise. Figure 3 also shows 
that noise greatly reduces diversity under bounded confidence. With mutation, some diversity can be sustained 
up to a confidence interval as broad as τ=0.65, but for larger intervals, the outcome approaches monoculture. For 
random interaction, the effect is even more extreme. For τ>0.25, monoculture is the unique equilibrium outcome. 
Convergence times show that the moderate diversity we obtained with random interaction below τ>0.25, is not 
an equilibrium state. In this region of the parameter space, the distribution of traits failed to converge within 107 
iterations. Had we run the experiment longer, monoculture would have been the ineluctable outcome. 
 Once we take noise into account, bounded confidence seems much less promising as a robust solution 
to the puzzle of cultural diversity. Morever, these limited effects were obtained using a test that may have been 
                                                 
4 Traits are initially uniformly distributed integer values within [0..Q-1]. For illustration: with τ = 0.5, two independent 
agents can have an overlap o ≥ 1-τ, if they either agree on exactly two nominal features and have a distance of 0.5 or less 
on the metric feature, or they agree on three or more of the nominal features. The probability for overlap on k nominal  
features can be obtained via the binominal distribution, and the probability for a distance less than or equal to some x on a 
metric feature is 1-(1-x)2. Overall, this yields a probability of about 0.019 for o ≥ 1-τ with F=5, Fn = 4, Q=15. For 
comparison, in the baseline condition the probability for overlap in at least one feature is about 0.29. 
Figure 3. Effect of confidence threshold τ on number of cultural regions in equilibrium for three different 
noise regimes, F=5, Fn = 4, Q=15. Averages based on 20 replications per condition after convergence.  
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too easy, in that we allowed only one metric feature out of five. Holding constant the number of cultural features 
and the size of the confidence interval, the more features that are metric, the less likely it is that two neighbors 
with random traits will disagree sufficiently to have no further interaction. Accordingly, we expect that the 
critical confidence threshold (that is, the maximum interval above which diversity collapses) will drop when the 
number of nominal features, Fn , is reduced, ceteris paribus. To test this, we replicated the no-noise condition of 
Figure 3 and varied the number of nominal features from 0 to 4, keeping the dimensionality of the state space 
constant at F=5. Figure 4 shows the results. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 confirms our expectation. The critical threshold required to sustain stable diversity declines in the 
number of metric features in the state space, fromτ=0.8 with only one metric feature, toτ=0.3 with five metric 
features. Had we also allowed noise, the results would be even more discouraging. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
In response to Axelrod (1997), computational models of cultural dissemination have pointed to noise as a key 
factor that can destabilize cultural diversity and promote cultural consensus. Our study reveals a new source of 
cultural consensus, metric features. We integrated noise and metric features into Axelrod’s original model. Our 
analyses of the extended cultural dissemination model showed that metric features undermine cultural diversity 
even without noise. In a metric state space, it is much less likely that neighbors will have zero cultural overlap, 
leaving a positive probability for ongoing mutual influence, leading ineluctably to monoculture in the long run. 
Recent extensions of another class of social influence models, opinion formation models, have identified an 
alternative solution to the puzzle of cultural diversity: bounded confidence. To test this solution, we integrated 
bounded confidence into our extended model of cultural dissemination. We showed how bounded confidence 
can sustain stable diversity even in the presence of metric features.  
 However, our results also raise doubts whether bounded confidence is a sufficient explanation for stable 
cultural diversity in a world where many cultural features are undoubtedly metric and noise is ever present. If we 
allow for mutation, random interaction, and the prevalence of metric features, the findings suggest that cultural 
diversity can only be sustained if confidence intervals are implausibly narrow, such that only agents who are 
nearly identical are able to influence one another.  
 Moreover, throughout our study we have assumed very small neighborhoods with minimal overlap. Yet 
previous work has shown that larger spatial overlap between neighborhoods also increases influence and thus 
reduces diversity (cf. Axelrod, 1997). Our results may actually be overstating the plausibility of bounded 
confidence as an explanation for cultural diversity. Given the obvious persistence of cultural diversity, even in an 
increasingly “small world,” the puzzle that motivated our research remains as perplexing as ever. 
 Looking forward, there are several possible extensions of the cultural dissemination framework that 
remain neglected by previous studies as well as our own. One or more of these extensions may help to explain 
Figure 4. Combined effect of confidence threshold τ and number of nominal features, Fn , on 
number of cultural regions in equilibrium, F=5, Q=15, r= r′ = 0. Averages based on 20 replications 
per condition after convergence. 
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persistent diversity. In particular, with the exception of  Mark (2003) and Macy et al (2003), previous studies of 
cultural dissemination have neglected the negative side of homophily and social influence -- xenophobia and 
differentiation. “Negativity” may explain why agents may remain different even when social interaction between 
them remains possible. However, Mark does not integrate both positive and negative mechanisms in a single 
model, and Macy et al. do not incorporate metric features with more than two cultural traits. While we have 
shown in this paper that metric states greatly reduce cultural diversity under homophily and social influence, we 
believe it is a promising avenue for future work to integrate xenophobia and differentiation into the cultural 
dissemination framework that we have elaborated here. 
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